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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 1999 Southern Networks deployed the Open Text Livelink knowledge management 
system (KMS). Livelink allowed for the centralization of key corporate applications 
and associated content at a global, regional, line-of-business, departmental and 
personal level. Prior to the implementation of Livelink on an enterprise scale, the 
corporation’s 94,500 employees relied on fragmented departmental web pages which 
were scattered across eleven different Web servers making the task of finding 
information very difficult. This paper describes how the process of knowledge 
transfer at Southern Networks changed with the deployment of Livelink and how it 
enabled the automation of workflows through the company’s Web-based Intranet. The 
paper also provides an insight into how KMS empowered employees, at least until the 
organization significantly downsized in 2001. The importance of this paper is in 
highlighting the role of people in the success of KMS and to provide examples of the 
knowledge sharing dynamics. 
 
ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND 
The Early Days 
Southern Networks Corporation, formerly known as SouthTel Limited, is a leading 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer with headquarters in Texas, USA. It has 
a long history dating back to the First World War when it manufactured radios and 
thereafter television sets. In the 1960s SouthTel began to manufacture digital 
switching systems, supplying operators throughout North America. They dominated 
circuit-switching technology in the public and private network space for decades until 
the rise of Internet Protocol (IP). SouthTel had an employee base of about 60,000 
people located in over 150 countries in the mid-90s. However, in 1998, a strategic 
decision was made by the CEO to make a “right angle turn” towards IP infrastructure, 
and merger plans were announced between SouthTel and Fiber Networks, 
instantaneously growing the workforce to 95,000 employees. While the new company 
Southern Networks profited from the timing of the merger in the short term (as stock 
market speculators predicted massive profits), the price of the company’s shares 
plummeted from US$99 to US$0.40 within a period of two year. In real terms, 
Southern Networks’ capitalization fell from $420 billion in September 2000 to less 
than $10 billion in August 2002. A saturated market and unrealistic business plans 
 
1 Southern Networks is a fictitious name that has been used to protect the organization in this real-life 
case study. Company products and application names have also been changed to this end. 
were blamed for the downturn (Figure 1). More recently accounting scandals have 
been reported. 
 
Figure 1. Southern Networks’ Quarterly Revenues (Q4 1997 – Q4 2001) 
 
Organization Structure 
The organization is divided into three regions for administrative purposes:  The 
Americas (containing both North and South America), Europe and the Middle East 
(EME), and Asia (including Australia and New Zealand). Each region has a president 
who is in charge of the sales performance for each country within that jurisdiction. 
Each country has account teams and business development managers who are tied to a 
given product portfolio and report to a country manager. The support functions 
include: pre and post sales engineering, global professional services, global customer 
care, supply chain operations, human resources, information services, finance, 
marketing and legal. The process from the point of getting business to the point of 
delivery can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Southern Networks’ End-to-End Sales-Delivery Process 
 
This case is written from the perspective of the Network Planning (NP) team located 
in Australia between 1995 and 2005. The NP team reported to the Professional 
Services support cluster under Customer Care Asia, and the broader Service Provider 
and Carrier Group (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Organization Chart 
CORP- Global President and CEO 
SPC- Global  President, Service Provider and Carrier Group 
SPC- Regional President, SPC, Asia 
SPC- Country   Vice President, Customer Care 
SPC- Australia   Director, Business and Network Planning 
SPC- Australia                                              Manager, Network Planning 
Southern Networks Quarterly Revenues
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
4Q
97
1Q
98
2Q
98
3Q
98
4Q
98
1Q
99
2Q
99
3Q
99
4Q
99
1Q
00
2Q
00
3Q
00
4Q
00
1Q
01
2Q
01
3Q
01
4Q
01
1Q
01
2Q
01
3Q
01
4Q
01
$
in
B
ill
io
ns
Customer
Relationship
Unified
Network
Solution
Customer
Post Sales
Engineering
Supply
Chain
Management
Customer
Care &
Support
Customer
Pre Sales
Engineering
Customer
Order
Win Form/
Bid
Support
Billing
The Workforce 
Today Southern Networks employs about 33,000 people, two-thirds of which are 
engineers. This is far from the burgeoning figure it employed at its peak of 94,500 in 
December 2000 when it acquired over 16 companies in a single quarter. At that time 
the market for skilled and scarce resources was so competitive that the company was 
prepared to pay its employees $3,000 USD for successful referrals (in addition to the 
new hire receiving a healthy lump sum to begin work immediately). In well-known 
high-tech valleys in the United States, competing companies were so aggressively 
poaching staff that a contract-based ‘ceasefire’ was declared between a number of 
leading organizations, preventing an employee from joining a competing firm within a 
six month period. Expansion was in the air, with large budgets allocated to the 
refurbishment of lavish office space and off-site employee team-building exercises. 
Authorization levels were also relaxed and sign-offs for amounts of $5,000 USD 
could be done by any manager without higher approval. The reigns were pulled back 
in February of 2001 when executives realized that the risks they had taken to 
accelerate the company’s market position had backfired. In one small research and 
development regional office in Australia, 50 of the 60 new graduate hires (some of 
whom had already been given a relocation allowance) were made redundant on the 
spot and given a 3-month redundancy package. By the end of 2001, the company had 
shed almost half its workforce in an amazing fall from grace (Figure 3). Whole 
departments were being slashed in a bid to decrease operational expenses and make 
profits look better.  
 
Figure 3. Southern Networks’ Downsizing Profile 
 
The Products 
Southern Networks have five lines of business (LoB): Carrier Voice over IP, Optical 
Long Haul Networks, Metro Networks, Wireless Networks, and eBusiness Solutions 
(Figure 4). While there is a reshuffle and re-badge of their distinct lines-of-business 
every couple of years, they mostly serve the needs of public network carriers, in the 
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Dec 01 16,500 further job cuts due to profit losses
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wireline, wireless and cable spaces. After the 2001 crisis, Southern Networks decided 
to change their strategic direction and only deal with customers that had real money to 
spend. This did not mean that they ignored enterprise-class customers but were 
merely wary of beginning negotiations with customers that were not serious about 
buying and just wanted free consulting advice. Southern Networks likewise stopped 
manufacturing a great number of their products that were unrelated to their core 
business. In addition, after the number of acquisitions in the late 90s, Southern 
Networks had too many products on their shelf and decided to phase out overlapping 
products that had similar functionality, or products that just had too low a margin. At 
one stage too many products were blamed for losses in sales that corresponded to 
customer confusion and internal product strategy wars. Others blamed the losses on 
the turbulence caused by over-inflated bandwidth predictions in the global 
telecommunications sector. 
 
Figure 4. Annual Revenue Breakdown by Line of Business (LOB) for December 2001 
 
The Customers 
The customers of Southern are mostly made up of large multinational global players. 
Southern Networks have supplied telecommunications equipment to the vast majority 
of the top fifty Fortune 500 companies. Smaller enterprise players like large 
businesses spanning a variety of industry sectors are also important to Southern’s 
sustained revenue. After all, it was in the early 90s that SouthTel became particularly 
well-known for their PABX solutions. Today Southern Networks has a presence in 
every continent- they are particularly looking at capturing some part of the lucrative 
People’s Republic of China market and entering into a number of joint ventures with 
local players. While they still maintain a presence in countries like Singapore and 
Thailand, their biggest opportunities in Asia are in China and India. 
 
Current Instability 
Unfortunately, the latest results report that Southern Networks has had a loss of $360 
million, or 9 cents per share in the last quarter, for the fourth successive quarter. This 
is highly problematic indicating the company has never quite recovered from the 
massive slump it went through in 2001. In 2004 revenues were about $US10 billion 
and their net income about $US60 million. The figures for 2005 showed revenues to 
be about $US8 billion and predictions for 2006 indicate an even further drop in 
Revenue by Line of Business (2001)
eBusiness 
Solutions
7%Wireless 
Networks
13%
Metro 
Networks
15%
Carrier 
VoIP
25%
Optical 
Long Haul 
Networks
40%
revenues. Further redundancies are looming- and one UK laboratory has already 
announced 3,000 more job losses in the next three months.  
 
With so many redundancies since the glory days of 1999, staff morale has been a 
major issue throughout the changes of the organization downsizing. While whole 
laboratories were closed down, there were some that remained opened but opted for 
eliminating particular departments over others. In some instances, friends and family 
were divided by the downsizing, which was costly to productivity, as lives were 
impacted. The company slogan “bringing people together” and the corresponding 
advertising theme song which was based on a 1960s hit single, did not hold up very 
long after all the hype had worn off. While downsizing had the temporary effect of 
making earnings look better to shareholders, continuing to cull one’s workforce would 
inevitably have major repercussions. Band-aid measures consisting of impromptu 
business plans and strategies to keep shareholders happy are no solution for long-term 
woes.  
 
How to continue to function competitively when an organization is in a state of flux, 
particularly how to manage knowledge as people come and go, is explored in the 
remainder of this case. The main objective of the paper is to tell the story of the 
impact that Open Text Livelink had on 95,000 employees and their information 
sharing practices in a corporation that spanned a presence in over 150 countries 
between 1996 and 2002. The before, during, and after KMS snapshots are presented 
to bring to the fore those overriding challenges, struggles and subsequent successes 
that follow an implementation of a large-scale eBusiness solution. In addition 
knowledge transfer dynamics in the company are explored, as are the effects of 
downsizing on the value of knowledge management. 
 
SETTING THE STAGE 
Knowledge management is defined as “the systemic and organizationally specified 
process for acquiring, organizing, and communicating knowledge of employees so 
that other employees may make use of it to be more effective and productive in their 
work” (Hahn & Subramani 2000, p. 302). It then follows that a knowledge 
management system (KMS) are all those components (software, hardware, people and 
processes) that support knowledge management initiatives. These may include but are 
not limited to work flow maps, web sites, portals, document management systems, 
customer relationship management (CRM), data warehousing, data mining processes, 
virtual teams, contact lists, databases, collaboration tools, applications and news 
(Davenport & Prusak 1998; Jashapara 2004). Although a term that is often used 
interchangeably with document management and information management, 
knowledge management seeks the higher ideal of wisdom, the tying together of the 
tacit and explicit realms. As Agostini et al. (2003) add: “knowledge is not important 
per se, instead the process of knowing, learning, and creating knowledge is the 
relevant aspect” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Leitch & Rosen (2001) believe 
knowledge management is a misnomer and prefer the term knowledge processes. 
Today leading organizations have adopted the current notion of business intelligence 
to describe the coming together of all these fundamental knowledge concepts. 
 
Knowledge Management System Features 
Livelink is a knowledge management and collaboration enterprise system. It allows 
employees to configure project workspaces, add folders, documents and web links, 
check in and out documents, maintain file versions, create aliases of documents so 
that there is no redundancy of information, discussion threads, favourites, news 
tickers, news channels, reports, document reservation, perform searches and queries, 
create tasks and define workflows, view documents, and an ability to set permissions 
via an access control mechanism. Livelink allows for the creation of workspaces 
which can be set at differing levels- from personal workspaces only visible to the 
individual employee, to department-wide workspaces that can be seen by colleagues, 
to corporate-wide workspaces that can be seen by the whole organization. Typically 
network planning projects run at the departmental level, while portal links relevant to 
all employees are located on corporate-wide workspaces (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. High-level Knowledge Management System Architecture 
 
Livelink at Southern Networks was implemented using an Intel server platform on an 
NT Server 4.0 operating system. The web server that was utilized was Microsoft IIS 
4.0. The chosen database was Oracle 8i and the web browser platform was Internet 
Explorer 5.01. The KMS Livelink server acted as a back end to the web server that 
received transactions, and a front end for the relational database management system. 
Livelink was deployed in clusters with numerous servers residing each in The 
Americas and EME, and one in Asia in Hong Kong, for a total of eight Livelink 
server instances. Each cluster catered for about 10,000 employees with system 
performance being maintained even during peak loads. One of the biggest advantages 
of Livelink was that administration for the system could be done at a local level. This 
was important as the information services department (ISD) was made redundant in 
mid-2001, after Southern Networks decided to outsource the competency. Each 
instance of Livelink required one contractor 24x7 to be allotted to its operation, save 
for the initial installation which required specialized set-up and associated portal 
development. 
 
KMS Deployment 
Livelink was deployed at Southern Networks in a staggered fashion. The company 
had long considered a virtual team/portfolio management approach to doing business. 
Indeed today in Australia, only the senior executive team have fixed office locations, 
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with the rest of the employee base using temporary workstations and being pulled 
together and apart dependent on the opportunity at hand. However, the notion of 
virtual teams struck at the core of the way the business ran. Previously, SouthTel had 
been known for its exhaustive development and manufacturing processes, at the cost 
of time-to-market. SouthTel’s solutions were always considered the Rolls-Royce 
telecoms solution, expensive yet very reliable and robust. The Internet however, was 
set to change the way people worked and the way corporations did business, 
especially as customer-to-supplier expectations were increasing and product 
innovation cycles were decreasing. 
 
In 1997, the Wireless Group in North America purchased a single instance of Livelink 
for the main purpose of competitive intelligence gathering. Although there were a 
number of groups that showed disquiet about the legacy Intranet, it was not until 1999 
that another instance of Livelink was purchased by the Design and Engineering 
Group. This group was interested in using knowledge management to develop 
advanced software technology products. It took until 2000 for a corporate wide basic 
Livelink system to be purchased allowing for previously disparate applications to be 
centralized onto a common portal (Figure 6). The data population of Livelink 
occurred in a haphazard fashion, at least at the grassroots level. From the perspective 
of the network planning employees (which numbered about 20 in all of Asia) there 
was little training provided, little preparation and planning for how to move forward, 
and not enough time allocated to formalising how the system was to be used. One of 
the team’s longest-serving network architects reflected that most of the data uploading 
was done after hours. With over 10,000 department files to upload, getting the legacy 
data into the KMS was not going to be easy, particularly because there were no 
defined rules on what to upload and what was deemed valuable with respect to the 
department’s core function.  Business operations do not suddenly cease for the 
introduction of new enterprise systems. In addition, some groups viewed as more 
important to the organization, had their departmental workspaces allotted well ahead 
of other groups, making some groups like the regional research and development 
laboratory in Australia, feeling left behind and unimportant to the business at large. 
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Figure 6. OpenText Livelink Rollout at Southern Networks 
 
CASE DESCRIPTION 
The Fragmented Intranet 
It was not that long ago that employees of global companies relied on fragmented web 
pages scattered across a multitude of servers throughout the world for their corporate 
information needs. Conducting searches for key pieces of data integral to the 
successful completion of a task was often a hopeless exercise. More often than not 
account project teams had to pour through completely irrelevant hits on the 
company’s search engine only to walk away without locating anything of value. 
Southern Networks employees working in offices throughout Asia in 1996 for 
instance, had limited access to information generated by employees in other regions. 
Even within Asia the practice of uploading data onto servers as a means of making 
documents available to others was uncommon, save for small software development 
teams whose work by its very nature demanded accessibility. File transfer protocol 
(FTP) servers were the closest anyone got to sharing data and these were often 
analogous to garbage dumps that were cleared periodically to free up server space. 
File naming conventions were absent, as was version control, and any other form of 
metadata describing individual documents.  
 
Beyond FTP servers, emailing attachments was heavily relied upon to the detriment 
of increasing operational costs. Employees in Asia were warned by superiors on 
occasion- even by the region’s president- to pick up the telephone instead of emailing, 
as the costs for transporting megabytes of data throughout Asia were becoming 
exorbitant. A good PowerPoint package for instance could make the rounds of your 
inbox even as often as five times from five different sources. It was also a topic of 
amusement and debate that original work completed by an employee in one office 
(e.g. a newly created Excel model) would make its way across the corporate intranet 
and come back several months later by email from another employee unknown to the 
original author. Sometimes authorship was even overridden and credit given to 
another individual who had simply adapted a few bits and pieces. This could be 
considered a form of internal plagiarism, save for the fact that the company 
theoretically owned the intellectual property. In other cases, information was emailed 
without an audit trail of recipients; there was no concept of privileges (save for 
hardcopy documents that contained a front cover distribution list). The word 
“confidentiality” acquired different meanings for different people. In fact, releasing a 
document to the account team, independent of the level of security clearance placed 
on it, meant that it would end up in the hands of customers within days, if not hours, 
even if the contents had not yet been fully discussed internally. Stating that something 
was “confidential” was like placing a magnet on it for unauthorized disclosure.  
 
On other occasions employees would receive large email attachments that had little, if 
anything, to do with their daily work tasks. As ‘downloading-on-demand’ was still 
unfeasible given the lack of infrastructure availability and adequate web training, 
broadcasting messages would ensure blanket coverage of the employee base and thus 
not miss any of the key recipients it was meant for originally. It was not on a few 
instances, however, that commercial Southern Networks product pricing lists 
(including margins and discount rates for different countries) would make the rounds 
of everyone’s email inbox. This was not only a careless practice but competitively 
foolish. The telecoms sector is a small world, many employees working at Southern 
Networks at the time, had extended family working in opposition vendors, 
particularly in the United States. Even worse was that this type of practice was never 
identified as strategically perilous by upper management. 
 
At the time the typical departmental setting was one where the majority of working 
information was stored on local hard drives instead of a common server with 
employees responsible for making their own back-ups of data. At Southern Networks 
in Australia key project member’s computers often fell victim to viruses or worms. 
And to make matters worse, as if the loss of files was not detrimental enough, back-up 
storage procedures for laptops and notebooks were non-existent. Project team 
members were often left scrambling to locate older versions of files to meet customer 
deadlines, on occasion losing days and even weeks of work and research. Employees 
also required numerous passwords for a variety of applications, most of which would 
expire or be forgotten. The absence of a central login to company applications was 
always a contentious issue as company employees lost valuable time waiting for IT 
personnel to reset passwords when they could have been working on important 
documents for customer engagements. Smart card secure ID badges were even 
deployed to staff in 1997 for remote access but due to synchronization problems they 
were abandoned some time later.  
 
The Problem of Knowledge Transfer 
The absence of a central portal for employees also meant that individual web-based 
applications were unknown unless the exact universal resource locator (URL) was 
marketed via email or some other general communications forum. Different 
departments within the company may have had their own web pages but again these 
were inadequate, poorly maintained and updated, contained broken links, and had a 
very small audience with little or no access security on the intranet. Up until 1998, 
subordinates in technical support teams like the network planning group relied on the 
ingenuity, good name, and goodwill of their supervisors and managers to gather and 
socialize important information. For this reason, a good supervisor could fast-track an 
associate engineer’s career giving them access to more. Other supervisors would 
hoard information, keep it to themselves for the purposes of self-promotion, and then 
tell their subordinates that they did not wish to overload them with unnecessary 
information. Employees in teams were expected to share their findings with one 
another in order to complete tasks but this was not always the company culture. It was 
impossible to know who the key experts in the company were for collaborating on 
projects, unless an employee was introduced by word-of-mouth or chain-style emails. 
To be good at one’s work, more often than not, meant that an individual had to have a 
good network of colleagues- knowing the right people could save an employee a great 
deal of time, not to mention raising the accuracy of the actual results or solutions 
proposed. 
 
Expatriates were often brought in to enhance the transference of knowledge between 
the US, the United Kingdom and other more isolated or newly established regions like 
Australasia. But no matter how good and strong these internal networks were there 
was always a question mark surrounding the vintage of the information sent by key 
contacts. Was it the latest product information for instance? Was the plan-of-records 
(PoR) the most recently defined? There was not always enough time to check these 
very important questions- especially given the time zone differences between Asia 
and other Southern Networks offices. One had to go on what they had as it was better 
than nothing and at least more accurate than a guesstimate. Sometimes consultants 
were seconded to projects for a short time, their access to company information was 
even more limited, and so they spent time reinventing the wheel, separated logically 
from the rest of the organization. 
 
Collaboration was mainly insular, within project teams, and there was no manner to 
denote who did what in the corporation. Even up until 1998, the online corporate 
directory only noted the employee’s name, telephone number, location, and reporting 
manager. Thus, the problems were not only physical in nature with regard to the 
corporate intranet infrastructure but were application-centric as well. Simple Word 
documents like company policies were even difficult to locate on local servers. These 
factors altogether contributed to a loss of productivity and propagated inefficiencies 
across departments. The problem however was not isolated to Southern Networks- all 
the other telecommunication giants were suffering likewise. Companies were 
struggling with how to manage “knowledge” in large corporations with complex 
product and service mixes. The answer was to evolve to a better working environment 
that took advantage of internet protocol (IP) and embraced it as a medium of 
communication. To this end, in late 1998 all Southern Networks employees were 
required to complete a basic IP certification course. 
 
Doing business at web-speed caused dramatic changes not only to the way 
information was exchanged but to the way people themselves worked. At about the 
same time that SouthTel merged with Fiber Networks and announced the change in 
focus from circuit-switched telephony to IP, the company CEO Jamie Ross, decided 
to invest in knowledge management (KM) to help facilitate the merger process, 
promote knowledge sharing among employees, encourage refinement of business 
processes through workflow management leading toward ISO9001 certification, offer 
a central login for employees, and assist in employee communications from the top 
down and vice versa. Ross was a CEO who sought opinions on particular issues 
directly from his employees. He purposefully showed by example, crafting global 
memos that were pages long of heart-to-heart reflection. He made employees feel 
special, even if they were entry level or worked in support functions. If he shared his 
thoughts openly, the mandate was that employees should also share more knowledge 
with each other. He urged employees to think together, and create an environment of 
openness to help win more business. His decision to implement a corporate-wide 
knowledge management system fundamentally came from an organization need to 
remain competitive, even though the decision to specifically purchase the Livelink 
system was allegedly decided on a golf course. 
 
The Process of Change 
Livelink did more than just enforce a technical change in infrastructure layout. It 
changed the way people worked and it challenged individual beliefs about ownership 
of information. The process of implementing a knowledge management system 
(KMS) was more than just about allowing the centralization of information and 
enabling the collaboration between individuals in different regions. It was to strike at 
the very core of departmental and global business practices. In fact, the 
implementation of Livelink coincided with the company’s efforts to attain ISO9001 
certification for as many different functional areas as possible. Some departments, 
like the Network Planning department in Asia, found the challenge almost impossible. 
There was no defined workflow to how employees in designated roles conducted their 
studies, and studies varied in time, size, complexity and resource requirements. Some 
employees continually insisted to work with local files and share only a selection of 
documents with their project team. One of the key architects in the Network Planning 
team in Sydney believed that their sophisticated models, if placed in the wrong hands, 
could have major repercussions on Australian business. He argued that his tools 
contained a great deal of sensitive customer and proprietary information, and if used 
inappropriately would mislead other customers or give competing companies unfair 
advantage. During the dot.com bubble, it was reported widely by the internal security 
team, that industrial espionage was a common happenstance. Southern’s security 
personnel warned of a spate of professional crimes that had taken place in the UK, 
eventuating in twenty-five stolen laptops in a single quarter, most of which had taken 
place at airports and hotel car parks. 
 
Chief knowledge officers (CKOs) were appointed in departments as well as ISO9001 
team leaders to help the process overcome initial teething problems. However the use 
of an ISO ‘policeman’ in each department put some individuals in some very difficult 
situations. Some employees clashed with the ISO mandate which made them 
automatically rebel against the use of Livelink when in actual fact the two were 
separate requirements. More generally, there was resistance to change toward 
Livelink, and a number of employees believed that this was primarily due to the lack 
of information provided to employees before the system was rolled out worldwide. 
For instance, some employees complained that it was too time consuming to upload 
and download relevant data from the KMS and have to record the adequate metadata 
for every single document (Table 2). While other employees saw the advantages of 
downloading-on-demand and the right to access useful information that could help 
make them more effective employees. Chief knowledge managers (CMO) for some of 
the larger departments were also appointed to promote the use and benefits of 
Livelink but these employees were often ostracized by others who did not respect 
their work. Most employees viewed these individuals as an unnecessary company 
overhead, claiming that they knew little about how the business worked and were 
restricted in what they could bring to teams as they were not involved in the initial 
creation of knowledge. Subsequently, the perception was that the need for chief 
knowledge managers to come up to speed meant that employees would be disrupted 
by incessant questioning. 
 
Table 2. Asia’s Network Planning Team - File Creation and Access (Before Livelink) 
Types of Files Average Number of Files (Viewed, 
Created or Modified) by Team 
Who Creates? Who Has Access? 
Plain Text 5 per day per user 
Files would vary in size from a 
couple of kilobytes to 10 megabytes.  
 
Few. Or 
sourced 
directly from 
the customer 
or a third party 
statistical 
agency. 
Highly restricted access 
if customer details 
contained within file. 
Otherwise general 
statistics shared to create 
realistic assessments of 
potential business. 
Emails 200 per day per user (15% of these 
containing attachments in excess of 1 
megabyte) 
Everyone Individual recipient or 
project group. 
Spreadsheet Size and complexity of spreadsheet 
varied. One workbook could contain 
even as many as 15 worksheets of 1 
letter page in size each. A model 
created in a spreadsheet environment 
Everyone Depends if the 
spreadsheet was a tool or 
contained customer data 
or contained 
demographics in a region. 
could also take 3 days to develop 
then another 2 days to refine and 
another 5 days to populate and run 
various scenarios with the correct 
details.  
File sizes would vary from 10 
kilobytes to 3 megabytes in size. 
Database 5 per user per day 
Files would vary in size from a 
couple of hundred kilobytes to 10 
megabytes.  
 
Usually 
market 
analysts 
Anyone who needed the 
statistical data. 
Visual Basic 
Code 
0.5 per user per day 
Typically small file sizes of code that 
would need to be compiled and 
executed. 
Skilled BNP 
tool 
developers 
The actual models 
developed were 
accessible on a ‘needs 
only’ basis and was 
dependent on whether the 
creator wished to grant 
access to other 
colleagues. Seldom was 
sharing the case unless 
multiple resources were 
allotted to project. 
Geographic 
Information 
Systems 
(AutoCAD, 
Mapping, 
Satellite and 
Aerial Photos) 
25 per user per day 
Very large files exceeding 10 
megabytes but depended on scale and 
resolution and whether the data was 
vector or raster imagery. 
Number of 
licenses 
dependent 
GIS-skilled personnel 
Presentation 
Software 
10 per user per day 
Typically between 300 kilobytes and 
10 megabytes. Depended on clip art 
used if sales presentation or other file 
types embedded with animation. 
All If tool-based for training 
purposes, all in the 
department have access. 
Some restrictions on 
sales presentations. 
Word 
Processing 
20 per user per day 
Varied from 20 kilobyte file size to 
400 kilobytes. With images or graphs 
the size could go as large as 2 
megabytes. 
All All 
Proprietary 
Project 
Management 
Software 
1 per user per day 
File sizes were typically small 
depending on what data was exported 
for reports. 
Senior 
manager with 
assistance 
from personnel 
All 
Third Party 
Business Case 
Software 
1 per user per day 
File sizes were typically small 
depending on what data was exported 
for reports. 
Business case 
skilled 
personnel such 
as solutions 
advisors.  
Relevant personnel on 
project, particularly 
members of the account 
team and the customer. 
Proprietary 
Network 
Planning and 
Dimensioning 
Software 
5 per user per day 
File sizes were typically small 
depending on what data was exported 
for reports. 
Solutions 
architects who 
are versed in 
traffic 
dimensioning. 
Pre-sales planners who 
require an understanding 
of a high level bill of 
materials (BoM). 
Business case developers 
need access to the capital 
expenditure also. 
Radio Network 
Planning 
Software 
0.05 per user per day 
Very large file sizes exceeding 1 
megabyte showing wireless signal 
strengths and digital elevation, clutter 
Radio 
planning 
department 
GIS-skilled personnel. 
Adobe Acrobat 
Files 
10 per user per day 
Typically 400 kilobytes to 700 
kilobytes. 
Product/techni
cal developers 
and human 
resource staff. 
Everyone 
Competitive 
Intelligence 
Reports 
20 per user per day 
Most of the files were in HTML 
format not exceeding 300 kilobytes. 
Third party 
suppliers like 
Yankee, IDC, 
Meta Group 
Everyone 
There were a number of shortcomings related to the KMS in 2000 many of which 
were linked to the capacity for Livelink to handle multiple file types, especially object 
programming code and geographic information systems (GIS) extensions. Other 
issues were about the actual implementation of the system, such as: where did the 
given department fit in the global organization structure, how would the department 
segment their server space to provide a repository of information that was meaningful 
in nature into the future, how could all the features of Livelink be utilized effectively 
etc. Timely training of how to use Livelink was also lacking and many of these 
courses came post-implementation. Colleagues first heard about Livelink through the 
grapevine, in an almost organic fashion, but when some groups had access and others 
did not it became a little confusing. The phased deployment plan was never 
communicated properly to employees, if at all, in some lines-of-business (LOB). 
Livelink definitely required top-level management support but even with this backing 
it still took some time for the sceptics to be converted. In essence the CMO was not 
saying that files could not be saved locally but that all working files had to be 
uploaded in a timely manner. When it came to deciding what kind of sensitive data/ 
models to upload and who could and should be able to view them, there were some 
interesting confrontations. In essence key personnel who were experts in a given area 
and were generating their own models to support their work tasks, did not wish to 
give up what made them special, for others to easily mimic or learn from with time. 
There continued to be some resistance until these same employees began to use access 
privileges for their uploaded files and essentially block everybody but themselves 
from using particular files. This was not in the true spirit of the KMS but at least this 
promoted another level of back-up storage. The facility for a personal (i.e. private) 
workspace on Livelink was available but few took advantage of it, opting to place 
work documents on the enterprise workspace or store things on their locally hard 
drive. 
 
Enter a Knowledge Infra-“structure” 
For some departments, the KMS was the answer to gaining timely access to internal 
and external intelligence information. For other departments, the KMS would help 
them in their quest to raise their profile by providing an avenue to showcase their 
work. But before launching any such site, groups had to work together to map out the 
layout and structure of their virtual space on the KMS. This was not an easy task 
especially for those who had been working with ill-defined processes in the past- they 
were not embarking on building a pretty web site but to some degree on aiming for 
best practice. The initial brainstorming period raised questions about how work was 
being carried out, the type of work being completed in some departments, and the 
level of quality and quantity of work being produced in other departments. In effect, 
this gave birth to project management demands in the company, and encouraged 
visibility and transparency throughout the organization. 
 
The knowledge infrastructure did not appear overnight. Groups worked for weeks and 
in some instances, months, to define what they believed would be a “future-proof” 
layout. After all, this space was to be the interface between them and the rest of the 
Southern Networks world. For the Network Planning team, this required a lot of 
collaboration, consultation, and review. It also had to be decided which documents, 
past and present, would be ported onto Livelink, how this would be done, and who 
would have the responsibility (Figure 7). In the end the manager and chief knowledge 
officers did the great majority of this work, believing in the system, and made it 
voluntary for other employees in the team to follow suit. It took some months before 
the whole group had bought into the idea but the team finally became proficient at 
using the KMS. During projects only the crucial documentation would be uploaded to 
Livelink and the URL shared with other collaborators. At the conclusion of projects, 
all the inputs, processing, and outputs would be uploaded to Livelink. For the 
Network Planning team, it was hoped that one day they would be able to use the KMS 
to automate their Bill-of-Materials (BoM) sheet for customers’ Request for Quotation 
(RFQ). The proposal was to create Adobe PDF forms for “inputting” and use 
extensible markup language (XML) to facilitate the end-to-end calculations in 
Microsoft Excel or Access. In this way it was hoped that reusable content and 
repeatable processes could save employees time and allow them to take on more 
projects than in the past, as well as decreasing their time-to-market (TTM). The idea 
was to be able to source data that was usually all over the place (in essence distributed 
and in different formats), and to put it into some structured context, where it had an 
invaluable role. Too often market researchers and financial analysts in the corporation 
would spend hours, if not days, searching for the right value- the KMS was about to 
change things. 
 
Figure 7. The Network Planning Departmental Workspace (Market-Client-Project) 
 
Initially only a small number of features were being used on Livelink from those 
available. For example, although it was possible to “check-in” and “check-out” 
documents, hardly anyone ever did. This would have ideally suited employees who 
were using databases and financial systems. Employees could also take advantage of 
creating metadata for their documentation or define access privileges but very few 
ever did. Naming conventions were specified, usually at the department level, but 
some documents complied while others did not. In brief, those practices that were pre-
Livelink were difficult to break after the implementation of Livelink, although bit-by-
bit, change did occur. For example, in the Network Planning team, filenames were 
made up of country telephone area codes, the type of task, the initials of the author 
and a date and version number. Livelink also allowed for the creation of workflows 
for specific projects, allocating tasks and their duration, and other dependencies. It 
was not that the feature was not useful but that project management skills were in 
short supply. 
 
Figure 8. Toward an Integrated Knowledge Infrastructure 
 
To some degree, the majority of the corporation was using Livelink as a Document 
Management System (DMS) in the beginning, but this changed as time went on and 
new applications were specifically created to help the employees of the corporation 
communicate and collaborate better. The notion of virtual teams became prevalent 
around the year 2000, and this is when the KMS became very important (Figure 8). 
Customers also, for example, were given access to an extranet space in Livelink 
where they could upload and share files with Southern. Account teams also made use 
of this capability to gather as much intelligence from clients and provide 
commensurate returns to them with product knowledge that was not accessible to the 
public via the external corporate site www.southernnetworks.com. Livelink helped 
consolidate and strengthen business relationships. Within six months of its 
introduction the benefits of the KMS were evident. Remote dial-up access users 
especially found it much easier to send around a URL embedded in an email than 
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having to wait over one hour to attach a file to an email and then send it to a list of 
recipients. It saved time and made employees more productive. One manager even 
credited the KMS to a growth in the number of patents generated by Southern 
Networks. In the past the organization was very customer responsive at the expense of 
their knowledge creation- Livelink facilitated this business process (Perna 2001). 
 
Knowledge Management Applications 
By the end of 2000, the knowledge management system was increasingly being touted 
as Southern’s most important corporate tool. It not only brought teams closer together 
that were previously geographically disparate but it formed the basis for the launch of 
the company’s key communication and collaboration applications including: Southern 
Portal, Strategic Advisor, Market Analyzer, Customer Aware, Sales.Channel, World 
Database Watcher, Corporate ID, Organization Structure, PeopleFind, Building 
Locator, EmployeeOnline, CareerDev, Employee Training and Development, 
Information Services, MeetingsOnline, Purchase Online, Travel Online and Stock 
Price, among others. Southern Portal let the CEO directly broadcast multimedia clips 
to all the employees in the corporation. Employees could watch the broadcast live, or 
download a broadcast and watch it later using Media Player. Southern Portal also 
reported the latest customer wins, highlighted key account and product strategies, and 
identified key employees and groups in the corporation. There were also a number of 
applications that supported sales-technical and marketing activities including: 
Sales.Channel, Customer Aware, Market Analyzer, and Strategic Advisor. Employees 
could use these portals to search for information about products, target markets, client 
backgrounds, and business case examples from across the globe. This knowledge 
empowered individuals and groups to produce higher quality output.  
 
Although employees performing searches on the Intranet would argue that results 
returned were information overload at times, this was better than days gone by, when 
no data whatsoever was available. The assumed information overload problem could 
also help employees by allowing them to compare facts from a variety of sources, and 
grant them the ability to make a decision on which data was the most useful for a 
given project. Employees could also quickly ascertain who their counterparts were in 
other regions and who would be a likely collaborator for advice on technical matters. 
While collaborative tools like MeetingsOnline and NetMeeting were not a 
consequence of Livelink, they were taken advantage of more, because employees 
were made aware of the services via the KMS. The applications were paramount to 
those employees who made use of them every single day and multiple times a day. 
Livelink had become so embedded in practice that when the Code Red worm infected 
servers it knocked out two days of productivity for most groups. Without access to the 
KMS, people could only use the telephone to communicate (if they had the name of 
the person they wished to contact), read printed matter and or use electronic resources 
on their local desktop. 
 
CURRENT CHALLENGES/PROBLEMS FACING THE ORGANIZATION 
In 2001, after dozens upon dozens of acquisitions, the company began to downsize as 
a direct consequence of the dot.com crash. At the time the share price of the company 
had reached some ninety-nine US dollars at its peak, and at its lowest fell to below 
one US dollar. The regime to downsize, in some cases meant that whole departments 
were made redundant- irrespective of the top talent within it- and this had a major 
repercussion on the value of the KMS in the organization. Members from one school 
of thought could argue that the introduction of Livelink was “just-in-time”, that it had 
taken root as an important tool before the downsizing was announced. Members from 
another school of thought could argue that the value of the KMS decreased after the 
rapid downsizing measures were enacted. Independent of the view taken the reality 
was that the KMS did help to retain corporate knowledge but it did not do so without 
end.  
 
The challenge for those still employed by the company was first to know about the 
knowledge (in some instances it had been made private or read access only), and 
second if obtainable to know what to do with the information and how to use it. While 
some documentation was still used after the departure of the document creator, in 
most instances, employees felt they had to generate a lot of new material. In Southern 
Networks what became clear was that there was an intrinsic link between knowledge 
management and collaboration; take the collaborator away and the knowledge 
available to you lessens in worth significantly. The company continued to take drastic 
downsizing measures from 90,000 employees in 2001 to some 30,000 employees in 
2004. Having cut about 60,000 jobs in three years the KMS could no longer expect to 
work miracles. The KMS once alive and used by so many, no longer had the same 
number of employees “feeding” it with information. Some employees, desperate to 
remain employed, even retreated to pre-Livelink practices, refusing to share their 
information with others, hoping that that would maintain their employability 
throughout the downsizing spiral. 
 
The value of knowledge management to large multinational corporations is 
undisputed (Housel, 2001). KMS is integral in organizations today that work at web-
speed and require the creation of virtual teams who rely on reusable content and 
repeatable processes. Knowledge management does grant competitive advantage 
(Tata, 2005). However it needs to be emphasized that a KMS is not just a technology 
that can be implemented and can succeed on its own. It is people who will ultimately 
drive its success or failure- it is embedded in practices people follow and in culture, 
i.e. the way people go about doing things. If used correctly KMS benefits are 
manifold including a dynamic working and learning environment that fosters 
information sharing and new value creation. Knowledge management helps 
employees build a collaborative culture, and create and extend their own personal 
business networks. Indeed there is a social side to this e-business solution. At no other 
time does this “socio-cultural” phenomenon become most obvious than when it is 
disrupted by necessary corrective actions to an organization’s size. In the case of 
Southern Networks employees, it was wonderful to share and create together until the 
threat of redundancies loomed and subsequently affected social practice. In times of 
downsizing the “one big happy family” culture is quickly overtaken by the “everyone 
for himself” reality and this has the effect of stifling the value of a KMS in the short-
term, especially as employee morale is generally low during these times of substantial 
change. It does not mean that the KMS loses its value altogether, to some degree it 
becomes increasingly important because there are less heads working together to 
solve the same number of problems. As the organization again reaches equilibrium 
the KMS can be used as a catalyst to re-build, re-create, and re-store. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 3. Southern’s Strategic Objectives in 2000 
Right Angle Turn: 
- Move from being a manufacturer of voice only telecommunications equipment to 
offering IP-centric solutions 
Outsourcing and Contracts: 
- Limit involvement in manufacturing and repairs and develop relationships with 
smaller contract players for supply 
Business Processes: 
- Streamline operations to compete with market leaders in unified networks market 
Expansion: 
- Form new alliances and acquire for faster time to market 
E-business Strategy: 
- Become involved in application service provisioning 
Table 4. Southern Networks’ Strengths vs. Weaknesses (1999) 
Strengths: 
- Major player in optical internet and high speed networks 
- Large customer base which is diversified 
- Expand broad product portfolio with diverse solutions (one stop shop) 
Weaknesses: 
- Time to market does not align with major competitors 
- Do not meet industry benchmarking indices (e.g. revenue per employee) 
- Brand awareness 
Table 5. Livelink Installation Specification 
Livelink Server Platform 
• Intel 
Operating Systems: 
• NT Server 4.0 
Web Servers 
• Microsoft IIS 4.0 (CGI and ISAPI) 
• Netscape iPlanet Web Server Enterprise 
Databases 
• Oracle 8i 8.16 Enterprise Edition 
• MS SQL-Server 7.0 
Web Browser Platform 
• Windows 2000 Professional 
Web Browser 
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 
